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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*
During Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait between August 1990 and March 1991,
(1) Ali Hassan Al-Majid, acting on the orders of Saddam Hussein, ordered Iraqi troops to remove
food, medical supplies, and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq, causing widespread hunger
and disease; (2) Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to destroy anything of value in Kuwait,
including oil wells, oil refineries, electric power generation facilities, water purification facilities,
hospitals, and other critical infrastructures which could not be transported into Iraq; and (3)
Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of Kuwait’s oil wells and the deliberate release of oil
into the Persian gulf. This memorandum examines whether any of these actions constitute a
crime within the jurisdiction of the IHT.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT” or “Tribunal”) has jurisdiction to hear cases involving
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws listed in
Article 14, which occurred from July 17, 1968 to May 1, 2003.1 In its interpretation of Articles
11, 12, and 13 of the IHT statute, the Tribunal may resort to the relevant decisions of
international criminal courts.2 Accordingly, this memorandum analyzes Iraqi crimes in light of
the relevant statutes and cases of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International
* ISSUE: During Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August of 1990 to March of 1991, several discrete
possible offences occurred. In particular: (1) Ali Hassan Al-Majid (acting on the orders of Saddam Hussein)
ordered Iraqi troops to remove food, medical supplies, and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq, causing
widespread hunger and disease; and (2) Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to destroy anything of value in Kuwait
(including such things as oil wells, oil refineries, electric power generation facilities, water purification facilities,
hospitals, and other critical infrastructures) which could not be transported into Iraq. Do these actions constitute a
crime within the jurisdiction of the IHT? When analyzing this fact pattern, pay close attention to the destruction of
Kuwait’s oil wells and the deliberate release of oil into the Persian Gulf. Discuss whether criminal liability may lie
for the environmental damage Kuwait suffered.
1

See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal at art. 2, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm
[hereinafter IHT Statute] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

2

See id. at art. 17.

1

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the International Military
Tribunal (IMT).
1. Article 12 – Crimes Against Humanity for the Removal of Food, Medical Supplies
and Medical Equipment
Members of the former Iraqi regime can be prosecuted for crimes against humanity for
removing food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq. Article 12 of the
IHT Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear cases involving crimes against humanity.3
To be prosecuted for a crime against humanity, five elements must be satisfied. There must be
(1) an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; (3) the attack must be
directed against any civilian population; (4) the attack must be widespread or systematic; and (5)
the perpetrator must know that his acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic
attacks directed against a civilian population, and must possess the requisite mens rea for the
underlying offense.4
The first element is satisfied because the act of removing food, medical supplies and
medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq constituted various attacks, including extermination,
torture and other inhumane acts.5 The second element is fulfilled because the removal of food,
medical supplies and medical equipment was objectively part of the attack. But for the removal
of these items, extermination, torture and other inhumane acts could not have taken place. The
third and fourth elements, that the attack was directed against any civilian population and that the
attack was widespread or systematic, is met because the Iraqi perpetrators committed the attacks
3

Id. at art. 12.

4

See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et. al., Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 85 (ICTY Appeals Chamber June 12,
2002), at http://www.un.org/icty/kunarac/trialc2/judgement/kun-tj010222e.pdf. [hereinafter Kunarac Appeals
Chamber][Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
5

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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against numerous Kuwaiti civilians as part of an organized plan. The last element, which
requires that the perpetrator commit the act with the mens rea of knowledge and intent, is
satisfied. Evidence indicates that members of the former Iraqi regime knew that their acts were
part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, and that they
intended to remove food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq.
B. Article 13 – War Crimes for the Removal of Food, Medical Supplies and Medical
Equipment, the Destruction of Kuwaiti Assets and Infrastructures and the
Destruction to the Environment
Members of the former Iraqi regime can be prosecuted for war crimes for (1) removing
food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq; (2) destroying Kuwaiti
assets and infrastructures, such as oil wells, oil refineries, electric power generation facilities,
water purification facilities, and hospitals; and (3) committing environmental atrocities by
destroying and igniting Kuwaiti oil wells, demolishing oil refineries and spilling oil into the
Persian Gulf. Article 13 of the IHT Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes.6
War crimes mean (1) grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 (“Geneva
Convention”);7 (2) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflicts, within the established framework of international law (“violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict”); (3) acts committed during armed
6

See id. at art. 13

7

See id. at art. 13(a); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950) [Hereinafter Geneva Convention I] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6], Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [Hereinafter Geneva
Convention II] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7], Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950) [Hereinafter Geneva Convention III] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8], and Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [Hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 9][collectively hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. The Geneva Conventions are
international treaties governing the laws of war. For a brief summary of the Geneva Conventions visit, Wikipedia,
Geneva Conventions, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Geneva_conventions (last modified 28 May 2005).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 73]

3

conflicts against persons not taking an active part in hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention or any other cause (“acts against persons not taking an active part in the hostilities”);
and (4) other serious violations of the laws and customs of war applicable in armed conflict not
of an international character, within the established framework of international law.8
To be prosecuted for a war crime, five elements must be satisfied. There must be (1) an
act (where “act” can be a number of deplorable offenses set forth in Article 13); (2) the act must
be committed by the perpetrator against a protected person or object; (3) the act must take place
in the context of and be associated with an armed conflict; (4) a nexus must exist between the act
and the armed conflict;9 and (5) the perpetrator must know of the factual circumstances that
established the protected status of the victim, must know of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of the armed conflict, and must have the requisite mens rea for the
underlying offense.10
a) There must be an Act
1) Removal of Food, Medical Supplies and Medical Equipment
The first element, the presence of an act, is satisfied. The removal of food, medical
supplies and medical equipment constituted various acts including (1) willful killing, inhuman
treatment, and willfully causing great suffering and serious injury to body and health, in violation

8

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

9

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 573 (ICTY Trial Chamber May 7, 1997).
[hereinafter Tadic Trial Chamber] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
10

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 13 (setting forth the various attacks which constitute “war crimes”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; See Iraqi Special Tribunal Elements of Crimes, Prepared by
Regime Crimes Liaison Office, at http://lawwww.cwru.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/IST_Elements.pdf at
art. 12(a)(2). [hereinafter Elements of Crimes] (setting forth the requirements for each type of attack). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 72]

4

of the Geneva Convention;11 (2) pillaging a town or place in violation of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict;12 and (3) murder, cruel treatment and torture,
committed against persons not taking an active part in the hostilities.13
2) Destruction of Kuwaiti Assets and Infrastructures
The destruction of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures also constituted various acts under
Article 13. The destruction amounted to “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,” in violation of the
Geneva Convention.14 The destruction also violated the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict including (1) intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects,
that is, objects which are not military objectives;15 (2) intentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause damage to civilian objects which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantages anticipated;16 (3)
attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are
undefended and which are not military objectives;17 (4) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings that are dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are

11

IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

12

Id. at art. 13.

13

Id.

14

Id.; See also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 7, art. 147 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding article relates
shall be those involving any of the following acts…extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

15

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

16

See id. at art. 13.

17

Id.
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not military objectives;18 and (5) destroying or seizing the property of an adverse party unless
such destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.19
3) Crimes Against the Environment
Members of the former Iraqi regime can be prosecuted for violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict for destroying Kuwaiti oil wells and oil
refineries, and spilling oil into the Persian Gulf. These strikes against the environment
constituted “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack would cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”20
Although Iraqi perpetrators should be held criminally liable for environmental damage,
prosecutors will have difficulty proving all elements of this crime.
Prosecutors must demonstrate that the oil fires and oil spills caused long-term damage to
the environment. Some commentators interpret “long-term” as lasting for months while others
require the damage to last for decades. If the IHT construes this requirement as lasting for
decades, prosecutors will have difficulty showing that the environment actually sustained “longterm” damage. Prosecutors will also have trouble proving that the Iraqi perpetrators possessed
the requisite mens rea because there is no direct evidence indicating that members of the former
Iraqi regime knew that the attacks would cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.” Finally, the prosecution must demonstrate that the environmental damage
was clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
Defense counsel will likely argue that the environmental damage was necessary and militarily

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.
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justified. This argument will likely fail because despite the fact that the oil fires and oil spills
provided a smoke-screen to cover the Iraqi retreat, the magnitude of the environmental damage
was clearly excessive in relation to the overall military advantage.
b) The Act must be Committed Against a Protected Person or Object
The second element, that the perpetrator commits the act against a protected person or
object, is met. The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment constituted acts
perpetrated against civilian persons in time of war and against armed forces who had laid down
their arms. The destruction of Kuwaiti infrastructures such as oil wells, oil refineries, electric
power generation facilities, water purification facilities, and hospitals constituted attacks against
objects protected by the IHT Statute and the Geneva Convention. Finally, the ignition of oil
wells and the spilling of oil into the Persian Gulf constituted attacks against the environment,
which is protected by the IHT Statute, the Geneva Conventions and other applicable international
laws.
c) The Act must be Committed During an Armed Conflict
The third requirement, that the act takes place in the context of and is associated with an
armed conflict, is satisfied. The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment, the
destruction of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures, the destruction of oil wells and oil refineries,
and the spilling of oil into the Persian Gulf, all took place during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and during the Gulf War. These acts and hostilities were sufficiently intense and organized to
constitute an armed conflict. Additionally, the absence of open hostilities from August 8, 1990
to January 16, 1991 and the Iraqi-declared annexation of Kuwait did not bring about the
cessation of the armed conflict.

7

d) There must be a Nexus between the Act and the Armed Conflict
The fourth element, the nexus between the act and the armed conflict, is present. The Iraqi
perpetrators removed food, medical supplies and medical equipment as part of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. Similarly, the destruction of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures occurred as part of the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Finally, the destruction of the oil wells, oil refineries and the release
of oil into the Persian Gulf, were acts aimed to combat coalition forces during the Gulf War.
e) The Perpetrator must Possess the Mens Rea of Knowledge and Intent
The final element, the perpetrator knows of the factual circumstances that established the
protected status of the victim, knows of the factual circumstances that established the existence
of an armed conflict, and has the requisite mens rea, is satisfied. The Iraqi perpetrators knew of
the protected status of the Kuwaiti civilians, the armed forces who laid down their arms, and the
protected objects. They also knew of the factual circumstances that established the existence of
the armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, and Iraq and the coalition forces. Finally, the Iraqi
perpetrators intended to remove food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to
Iraq, intended to destroy Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures, intended to destroy oil wells and oil
refineries, and intended to spill oil into the Persian Gulf.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. General Background
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (“Saddam”) ordered Iraq to invade
Kuwait. Reasons for invading Kuwait included seizing control of its oil, generating revenue to
pay off debts from the 1980-1988 war with Iran, and reclaiming Kuwaiti land, which had
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historically been part of Iraq.21 In direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 660,22
Iraqi troops infiltrated and captured Kuwait. Subsequently, Saddam set up a brief Iraqi puppet
government before declaring the country annexed on August 8, 1990.23
The UN Security Counsel responded to the Iraqi invasion with severe penalties.
Resolution 661, passed on August 6, 1990, authorized the use of sanctions against the Iraqi
regime, including the cessation of imports and exports into or out of Iraq and Kuwait.24 By
August 25, the Security Council passed Resolution 665, calling for an embargo of all “inward
and outward maritime” shipping.25
The embargos were effective; Iraq could not export any Iraqi-made commodities nor
could it sell the newly acquired Kuwaiti assets. Ironically, Iraq controlled 25 percent of the
world’s oil reserves, but it could not market any of it.26 UN sanctions also restricted Iraqi
imports, including supplies and food. These restrictions acted as a double-edged sword. Iraq, a
country known for importing 75 percent of its food, 27 now had nothing to feed its 17 million
residents. Moreover, Iraq had no food for the 1.5 million subjugated Kuwaitis. As Iraq ran out

21

See Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons From the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L. &
POL’Y 481, 484 (1994). [Hereinafter Seacor] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]
22

S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (demanding “that Iraq withdraw
immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990”).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

23

See Wikipedia, Gulf War, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war#Invasion_of_Kuwait (last modified 15, March
2006). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 74]

24

S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35]

25

S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25. 1990). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35]

26

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & EFRAIM KARSH, THE GULF CONFLICT 1990-1991 (Princeton University Press) (1993) at
189. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

27

Id. at 191 (citing SUSAN B. EPSTEIN, THE WORLD EMBARGO ON FOOD EXPORTS TO IRAQ (Washington DC, Library
of Congress, Congressional Research Service) (25 September 1990)).
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of food and supplies, it looked to Kuwait to obtain the provisions it needed as well as the
provisions it desired.
B. Removal of Food, Medical Supplies and Medical Equipment from Kuwait to Iraq
The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait provided Iraqi forces with the opportunity
to partake in extensive plunder. Iraqi forces pillaged Kuwaiti food warehouses and
supermarkets, and stole medical supplies and medical equipment. Iraqi forces raided the Kuwait
Organ Transplant Center, the Kuwaiti Gastroenterology Center and Kuwaiti blood banks. 28
Some of the items reported stolen included plasma deposits,29 technical medical equipment,
dental chairs, and ambulances.30 All of these items were transferred back to Iraq.
In a September 2, 1990 letter to the UN Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative
of Kuwait listed some of the actions carried out by the Iraqi occupation authorities, including:
1. theft from the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Association stores of provisions, medical supplies
and tents set aside for relief operations in disaster-stricken countries
2. looting of food and medical supplies from public, government and private stores, food
shops and pharmacies
3. theft of all equipment from private and public hospitals, including x-ray machines,
scanners and pieces of laboratory equipment
4. robbery of medicines and unused modern equipment from the warehouses of the Ministry
of Public Health and the Kuwait Pharmaceutical Industries companies, all which valued
at over 20 million Kuwaiti dinars. 31

28

ABDULLAH M. AL-HAMMADI, TORTURING A NATION A DOCUMENTED STUDY OF THE IRAQI AGGRESSION
TOWARDS KUWAITI PEOPLE (2ND AUGUST 1990-26TH FEBRUARY 1991) (Al Wazzan International Press Co.) at
187. [hereinafter Torturing a Nation] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]; See also Letter from the
Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Sept. 5, 1990), in
CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS SERIES, VOL. 1, THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS (E. Lauterpacht
CBE, QC, C.J. Greenwood, Marc Weller & Daniel Bethlehem eds., Grotius Publications Limited) (1991) at 269.
[hereinafter Letter from Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations] [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 40]
29

Id. at 269.

30

See Torturing a Nation, supra note 28, at 187. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

31

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Sept 2, 1990, supra note 28, at 26869. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]
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Three days later, the Permanent Representative from Kuwait sent a second letter to the
Secretary-General describing the effects of the looting. The “delicate medical equipment used in
the intensive care units of many Kuwaiti hospitals has been seized and taken to Baghdad. This
has led to the death of many patients who were receiving intensive care.”32 Also, “the incubators
in maternity hospitals used for children suffering from retarded growth (premature children) have
been removed, causing the death of all the children who were under treatment.”33 According to
statistics, death rates escalated in patients from 0-50 years.34 Additionally, cases of infections,
dehydration, diabetes, and hypertension increased in previously modern, well-equipped
hospitals.35
Iraqi documents discovered after the Gulf War indicate that the Iraqi pillage and plunder
of Kuwait was part of an official Iraqi policy. In a letter directed to Ali Hassan Al-Majeed,36
Saddam’s cousin and “hatchet man,”37 General Director of Health Services Dr. Abdulijaba
Abdulabbas requested approval to shut down Kuwaiti health care centers and take Kuwaiti
devices, equipment, furniture and pharmaceuticals to Baghdad.38 Similarly, an Iraqi document
signed by Ahmed Hussain, the Chairman of the Iraqi Presidency Diwan, on September 15, 1990,
32

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Sept. 5, 1990, supra note 28 at 267.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]

33

Id. at 267; See also Torturing a Nation, supra note 28, at 188 (describing that the removal of the medical
equipment along with the departure of Kuwaiti doctors and nurses and the subsequent deterioration in sanitary
conditions all contributed to the death of infants, the aged and mentally and physically handicapped patients).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29] See also SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, REPORT ON IRAQI WAR
CRIMES (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM) (1992) at 9 (reporting that 120 babies were left to die after being removed
from incubators that were taken to Iraq). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41]
34

See Torturing a Nation, supra note 28, at 188. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

35

See id. at 188.

36

Also spelled Ali Hassan Al-Majid.

37

Human Rights Watch, Who Was Ali Hassan Al-Majid (“Chemical Ali”)?, at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/04/07/iraq5508.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 71]

38

See Torturing a Nation, supra note 28, at 543. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
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sought to form “a central committee to take stock, appraise and transport goods from The State
of Kuwait Governance.”39 These letters were just a few of the many documents sent to Iraqi
leaders requesting or instructing Iraqi forces to confiscate Kuwaiti medical equipment,
appliances, and drugs, and to transfer them back to Iraq.40
C. Destruction of Kuwaiti Assets and Infrastructures
During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi forces destroyed Kuwaiti assets and
infrastructures. Iraqi forces damaged and destroyed oil wells, oil refineries, electric power
generation facilities, water purification facilities and hospitals. Additionally, Iraqi forces
invaded and desecrated houses of worship, searched and ransacked homes, looted public and
private facilities, such as the Central Bank, commercial banks and places of public business,
cleared warehouses and co-operative societies of foodstuffs causing starvation among Kuwaiti
citizens, and stole public and private vehicles to be sent to Iraq.41 Other attacks included burning
and bombing civilian homes42 and deliberately destroying health care facilities. 43 This type of
devastation was meant to “suppress the Kuwaiti community and to inflict massive torture on
them.”44 In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait wrote

39

See id. at 315.

40

HUSSAIN ‘ISA MAL ALLAH, THE IRAQI WAR CRIMINALS AND THEIR CRIMES DURING THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF
KUWAIT (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait) (1998) at 301-310 (these documents were dated from August
24, 1990 to November 18, 1990). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
41

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Aug. 5, 1990, supra note 28, at 267.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]

42

ABDULLAH M. AL-HAMMADI & ABDULATEEF A. AL-ABDALRAZAQ, ATLAS OF IRAQI WAR CRIMES IN THE STATE
OF KUWAIT ( Al Qabas Commercial Press) (1995) at 7. [hereinafter Atlas of Iraqi War Crimes] [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28]
43

See Torturing a Nation, supra note 28 at 193. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

44

See id. at 313.
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that the Iraqi aggressions intended to “intimidate the Kuwaiti people for the purpose of
compelling [them] to co-operate with the puppet government installed by the occupation.”45
Evidence indicates that Iraqi forces intentionally destroyed Kuwaiti assets and
infrastructures. For example, Iraqi Brigadier Staff Nabeel Abdullah Shaheen and Hadi Mahmud
Jasem recommended the destruction of water pumps and control rooms, radio and TV stations,
wireless communications, Jahra-Safwan Road and satellite stations.46 According to Water
Kalin’s report concerning the human rights in the State of Kuwait, Iraqis engaged in deliberate
sabotage of oil, electric, water, communication and drainage facilities.47 This extensive and
deliberate destruction accurately reflected the slogan of the Iraqi perpetrators: “Loot and Burn.”48
D. Destruction of Oil Wells and Deliberate Release of Oil into the Persian Gulf
From the start, Saddam made it clear that he would not hesitate to use oil as part of his
military campaigns. For example, after the UN passed Resolution 678 authorizing the Member
States to “use all necessary means” to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait,49 Saddam promised
that if he had to be evicted from Kuwait by force, he would burn Kuwait.50 A month later,
Saddam asserted that “if Iraqis were to use oil for self-defense, then the Iraqis [would] be

45

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Aug. 5, 1990, supra note 28, at 267.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]

46

MAL ALLAH, supra note 40, at 253. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]

47

See Torturing a Nation, supra note 28, at 313 (noting that this report was made in accordance with the resolution
of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 76/1991 and issued by the Social and Economic Council of
the United Nations on January 16, 1992). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

48

IRAQI AGGRESSION ON KUWAIT: A CRIME UNPARDONABLE (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait) (1996) at
56. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34]
49

S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29 1990). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35]

50

THE GULF WAR AFTERMATH AN ENVIRONMENTAL TRAGEDY (Muhammad Sadiq & John C. McCain eds., Kluwer
Academic Publishers) (1993) at 2. [hereinafter Gulf War Aftermath] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
42]
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justified for taking such action.”51 Shortly after the commencement of Operation Desert Storm,
Saddam acted on his threats.
On January 22, 1991, Iraqi forces intentionally released oil from two oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf.52 A few weeks later, Iraqi forces ignited over 700 Kuwaiti oil wells.53 According
to the Kuwaiti Oil Company, the oil burned at a rate of 6 million barrels per day and a total of
1.12 billion barrels of oil were lost in the fires.54 Additionally, Iraqi troops attacked the seas by
pumping millions of barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf from supply lines between oil refineries
and an offshore terminal.55 Iraqi forces also dynamited Sea Island Terminal and five tankers at
oil ports Mina Al Ahmadi, Abu Halifa, and Shuaiba,56 spilling an estimated 8 million barrels of
oil.57
The oil fires and the oil spills damaged the Kuwaiti environment and devastated
ecosystems across the globe. Particularly, the oil harmed terrestrial and marine wildlife,
damaged soil and vegetation, contaminated water, and polluted the air.58 Oil residue and soot
killed camels, chickens, desert rodents, lizards, birds, turtles and many other species. The oil

51

KRISTINE HIRSCHMANN, THE KUWAITI OIL FIRES (Matt Levine ed., Facts On File, Inc.) (2005) at 12-13.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]
52

Mark J. T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: Customary Substance
over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1993). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
59]

53

HIDDEN CASUALTIES ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
(Saul Bloom, John M. Miller, James Warner & Philippa Winkler eds., North Atlantic Books) (1994) at 82.
[hereinafter Hidden Casualties] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]

54

See Gulf War Aftermath, supra note 50, at 60. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]

55

Seacor, supra note 21, at 486. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]

56

Hidden Casualties, supra note 53, at 46. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]

57

Id. at 46.

58

JOHN KING, DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD THE INVASION OF KUWAIT (Raintree) (2004) at 32. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 36]
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contaminated Kuwaiti freshwater supplies at Um Al-Aish and Raudhatain.59 Satellites captured
images of oil lakes, tar mats and soot covering 700 square miles of Kuwaiti desert.60 Black rain
fell in Saudi Arabia and Iran, oil-streaked snow descended on parts of Turkey, and oily smoke
found its way into the tropical skies over Hawaii.61 According to Ruman Bojkov of the World
Meteorological Organization, the Kuwaiti oil fires generated acid rain which damaged the plants
and soil of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the southern Soviet Union.62
The oil-related pollutants also caused human disease and sickness. Respiratory and
cardiovascular disease rose in the wake of the oil fires.63 Specifically, cases of bronchial disease,
asthma and upper-throat infections increased.64 While short-term effects to the environment and
to human health manifested immediately, many of the long-term effects have yet to be realized.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
The IHT has jurisdiction to hear cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws listed in Article 14. It is unlikely that the removal of
food, medical supplies and medical equipment, the destruction of Kuwaiti assets and
infrastructures, the destruction of Kuwait oil wells and oil refineries, and the release of oil into
the Persian Gulf, constituted genocide or violation of certain Iraqi laws listed in Article 14. This

59

Hirschmann, supra note 51 at 53. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

60

Id. at 52.
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Id. at 30.
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Id. at 30-31.
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Gulf War Aftermath, supra note 50, at 234. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]

64

Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case
Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1, 41 (1992). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
68]
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portion of the memorandum, however, analyzes whether the acts committed by the Iraqi
perpetrators amounted to crimes against humanity or war crimes.
A. Article 12 – Crimes Against Humanity for the Removal of Food, Medical Supplies
and Medical Equipment
Article 12 of the IHT Statute grants the Tribunal authority to hear cases involving
“crimes against humanity.”65 Crimes against humanity are defined as
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Willful Murder;
Extermination;
Enslavement;
Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental norms of international law;
F. Torture;
G. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
H. Persecution against any specific party or group of the population on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to as a form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity;
I. Enforced disappearance of persons;
J. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to the body or to the mental or physical health. 66
International courts have interpreted crimes against humanity as including five
elements:67 (1) there must be an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack;
(3) the attack must be directed against any civilian population; (4) the attack must be widespread
or systematic; and (5) the perpetrator must know that his acts constitute part of a pattern of
widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population, must know that his acts
65

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

66

See id. at art. 12.

67

Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 91 (2004). [hereinafter Badar] [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 62]
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fit into such a pattern, and must possess the requisite mens rea for the underlying offense.68 The
removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq constitutes a
crime against humanity – it was an act perpetrated as part of a widespread and systematic attack
directed against a civilian population and committed with knowledge and intent.
1.

There must be an Attack
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq

constituted an attack against a civilian population. An “attack directed against a civilian
population” means a “course of conduct involving the multiple panel of acts referred to” in
article 12, paragraph 1 of the Statute “against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”69 The removal of food,
medical supplies and medical equipment involved several of the “multiple panel of acts”
including “extermination,”70 “torture,”71 and “other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or to the mental or physical
health” (“other inhumane acts”).72

68

Kunarac Appeals Chamber, supra note 4, at para. 85. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

69

See IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

70

Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, at art. 12(a)(2) (stating that extermination requires that (1) the perpetrator
killed, either directly or indirectly, one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring
about the destruction of part of a population including, but not limited to, the deliberate deprivation of resources
indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes; and (2) the
conduct constituted, or took place as part of (including the initial conduct of), a mass killing of members of a
civilian population). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72]

71

Id. at art. 12(a)(6) (stating that torture requires that (1) the perpetrator willfully inflicted severe physical or mental
pain or suffering upon one or more persons; (2) such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of
the perpetrator; and (3) such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to,
lawful sanctions).
72

Id. at art. 12(a)(10) (stating that other inhumane acts requires that (1) the perpetrator willfully inflicted great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act; and (2) such act
was of a character similar (in terms of the nature and gravity of the act) to the offences that are contained in Article
12(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal).
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a) Extermination
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq
constituted extermination. Extermination means “the intentional infliction of living conditions,
such as the deprivation of access to food and medicine, with the intent to bring about the
destruction of part of the population.”73 Extermination can be considered murder on a massive
scale.74 It is a crime which requires an element of mass destruction and by its very nature is
directed against a group of individuals.75 However, courts do not require a specific number of
people to die in order for the act to rise to extermination.76 In Akayesu, the ICTR found
defendant Akayesu guilty of exterminating sixteen people.77
Historically, extermination was a crime of persecution, requiring an attack based on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. 78 The IHT removed this condition. It is
unnecessary to prove that discrimination was the underlying force behind the attack. It is only
necessary to show that the act constituted the type of deliberate deprivation of resources
indispensable for survival. The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment

73

IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

74

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 142 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21]

75

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 591 (ICTR Trial Chamber Sept. 2, 1998).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

76

Kayishema, supra note 74, at para. 142. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
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Akayesu, supra note 75, at para. 744. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
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David A Luban, Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 99 (2004) (stating, “Ratner and
Abrams, drawing on Nuremberg and CCL No. 10 decisions” found that extermination was a crime of persecution).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49]; See also Statute of the Int'l Criminal Trib. for Rwanda,
U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) at art. 3. [hereinafter
ICTR Statute] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; See also Akayesu, supra note 75, at para. 592
(where the court held that the attack must be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]; See also Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, art. 6(c), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm. [IMT Charter] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 1]
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brought about living conditions intended to destroy part of the Kuwaiti population, particularly,
the children, the elderly and the sick who were residing in Kuwaiti health care facilities.
b) Torture
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait constituted
torture. The IHT Statute does not provide a clear definition for “torture.” However, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.79

While this definition provides some guidance, the IHT does not require a specific purpose for
torture. 80
Under the IHT, prosecutors must show that the perpetrators willfully inflicted severe
physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons, the person or persons were in the
custody or under control of the perpetrator, and such pain or suffering was not inherent to lawful
sanctions.81 The act of removing food, medical supplies and medical equipment embraced these
elements. Iraqi forces willfully inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the
Kuwaitis by removing food, medical supplies and medical equipment. This torture occurred
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while the Kuwaitis were under the control of Iraq. Lastly, the attacks were not part of lawful
sanctions.
c) Other Inhumane Acts
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment constituted “other
inhumane acts.” Other inhumane acts is a category reserved for acts committed with similar
gravity and seriousness as the other enumerated crimes, and which constitute deliberate forms of
infliction with comparable serious inhumane results that are intended or foreseeable and done
with reckless disregard.82 This catchall provision is found in the IMT Charter,83 the ICTY
Statute,84 the ICTR Statute,85 the SCSL Statute,86 the Rome Statute,87 and the IHT Statute.88 If
the prosecution fails to prove the elements of extermination or torture, it will likely be able to
prove the elements of “other inhumane acts.”
In proving other inhumane acts, courts have required the prosecution to adequately
particularize the pieces of evidence in support of the other inhumane acts charges.89 In
Kayishema, the Trial Chamber held that the prosecution failed to prove its case for other
inhumane acts because it did not identify the other inhumane acts in the indictment, and its
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subsequent offering of evidence at the end of the trial violated the fundamental rights of the
accused. A case can certainly be made that the removal of food constituted the inhumane act of
starvation,90 and that the removal of medical supplies and equipment constituted inhumane
treatment. In prosecuting members of the former Iraqi regime, however, the prosecution must
distinguish the other inhumane acts from other acts in the statute. Additionally, the indictments
for other inhumane acts should be made at the beginning of trial, and not applied as a fallback
position.
2.

The Act of the Perpetrator must be Part of the Attack

The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was part of the attack. A
“crime against humanity” can only be satisfied by showing that the commission of the act, by its
nature or consequences, was objectively part of the attack.91 The removal of food, medical
supplies and medical equipment fulfills this element because the confiscation of Kuwaiti
provisions led to extermination, torture and other inhumane acts such as starvation and inhumane
treatment.
3.

The Attack must be Directed Against any Civilian Population
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was directed against a

civilian population. Courts and other authorities have interpreted the components of “directed
against any civilian population” very particularly. For example, “directed against” (any civilian
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population) refers to the fact that the “civilian population is the primary object of the attack.”92
However, this does not require that the attack be part of the military operation.93 The term
“civilian,” as applied in the context of an international conflict, indicates a person who is not a
member of the armed forces of any party to the conflict. 94 In addition, courts will defer towards
calling an individual a civilian in cases of doubt or ambiguity.95 The word “population” refers to
a larger body of victims;96 however, this does not have to mean an entire population of a State.97
Finally, the attack does not have to be directed against a specific civilian population. The IHT
grants wide protection over civilians by prescribing that the attack can be directed against “any”
civilian population.98 In light of these definitions, the removal of food, medical supplies and
medical equipment constituted an attack “directed against any civilian population” because the
attacks were directed against Kuwaiti citizens.
4.

The Attack must be Widespread or Systematic

The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq
fulfills the fourth element of a crime against humanity which requires that the attack be
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widespread or systematic. 99 “Widespread” refers to the number of victims and “systematic”
refers to the existence of a policy or plan.100 The purpose of this element is to exclude isolated or
random acts.101 “Crimes against humanity shock the conscience of mankind and warrant
intervention by the international community precisely because they are not isolated, random acts
of individuals, but instead result from a deliberate attempt to target a civilian population.”102
a) Widespread
Widespread “may be defined as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”103 In
its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) required that crimes
against humanity be “committed on a large scale.”104 The ILC’s commentary described “large
scale” as “cover[ing] various situations involving [the] multiplicity of victims, for example, as a
result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane
act of extraordinary magnitude.”105 The ILC offered the Nazi policy of terror as a prime
example of crimes carried out on a vast scale.106
Similarly, the attacks against the Kuwaiti citizens were widespread. Although exact
numbers of victims are unknown, countless Kuwaitis died from the denial of food, medical
99
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supplies and medical equipment. The numbers are large enough to constitute a widespread
attack. (See Table 1 infra page 49)
b) Systematic
Systematic “may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on
the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.”107 A
“systematic” attack requires a high degree of orchestration and methodological planning.108
According to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the inhumane acts committed by the Nazis were part of a
systematic policy of terror.109 Likewise, the removal of food, medical supplies and medical
equipment was systematic. Iraqi documents left behind in Kuwait demonstrate that Iraqi
commanders ordered, requested or were instructed to partake in attacks against Kuwait and its
citizens.110 This evidence establishes the “systematic” nature of the attacks.
5.

The Perpetrator must Possess the Mens Rea of Knowledge and Intent
Iraqi perpetrators committed crimes against humanity with knowledge of the attendant

circumstances and intent to commit the specific act. The IHT requires that the perpetrator know
that his acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a
civilian population and know that his acts fit into such a pattern. Additionally, the perpetrator
must have the requisite mens rea for the underlying offense. Specifically, extermination,
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persecution and other inhumane acts require intent.111 The existence of knowledge and intent
can be inferred from the relevant facts and circumstances.112
a) Knowledge
Knowledge means an awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in
the ordinary course of events.113 It is likely that Iraqi perpetrators had knowledge of the attacks.
(i.e. the perpetrators knew that the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population). This requirement is
consistent with the ICTY’s interpretation of the mens rea requirement that “the perpetrator must
know of the broader context in which his act occurs.114 Nonetheless, the IHT Statute does not
require the perpetrator to have knowledge of all the circumstances of the attack or the precise
details of the plan or policy under which it was executed.115
Evidence reveals that Iraqi forces not only knew about the removal of food, medical
supplies and medical equipment but intended to engage in this particular conduct. Documents
recovered after the Gulf War indicate that the removal of food, medical supplies and medical
equipment was executed as part of an Iraqi policy.116 This type planning and execution could not
have been accomplished without knowledge of the underlying circumstances.
b) Intent
Intent means the person either planned to engage in particular conduct to cause a specific
consequence, or was aware that a particular consequence would occur in the ordinary course of
111
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events. Intent can take three forms: dolus directus, dolus indirectus, and dolus eventualis.117
Dolus directus means intent in which the illegality and/or harmful consequences of the act are
foreseen and desired by the perpetrator.118 Dolus indirectus is intent in which certain secondary
consequences in addition to those desired by the perpetrator of the act were foreseen by the
perpetrator as a certainty, and although the perpetrator did not desire those secondary
consequences he or she nevertheless committed the act and those consequences set in.119 Finally,
dolus eventualis means intent in which the perpetrator foresees consequences other than those
desired as a possibility (including a likelihood of the consequences setting in) and nevertheless
went ahead with the act.120
There is disagreement over whether all three forms of intent should be applicable mens
rea. According to the Regimes Crimes Liaison Office’s Elements of Crimes, which guides the
IHT, intent requires the perpetrator to be aware that a consequence will occur. 121 Construing
intent in this manner only validates dolus directus and dolus indirectus. This interpretation is
consistent with that of the ICC, which requires more than mere knowledge of the possibility or
likelihood that an atrocity may happen.122 In contrast, Professor Antonio Cassese, a leading
authority in international law, interprets intent as including dolus eventualis.123
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If the IHT refuses to recognize dolus eventualis, Iraqi perpetrators can still be convicted
under the theories of dolus directus or dolus indirectus. It will be very difficult to prove dolus
directus, however, because the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment aimed
to garner provisions for Iraq, not to bring about extermination, torture and other inhumane acts.
Nevertheless, members of the former Iraqi Regime possessed dolus indirectus; they could
foresee with certainty that the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment would
result in extermination, torture and other humane acts.
B. Article 13 – War Crimes for the Removal of Food, Medical Supplies and Medical
Equipment, the Destruction of Kuwaiti Assets and Infrastructures, and the
Destruction to the Environment
Members of the former Iraqi regime can be prosecuted for war crimes for (1) removing
food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq; (2) destroying Kuwaiti
assets and infrastructures, such as oil wells, oil refineries, electric power generation facilities,
water purification facilities, and hospitals; and (3) committing environmental atrocities by
igniting Kuwaiti oil wells, destroying oil refineries and spilling oil into the Persian Gulf. Article
13 of the IHT Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear cases involving “war crimes.”124
“War crimes” mean (1) grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;125 (2)
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts,
within the established framework of international law; (3) attacks on persons not taking an active
part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause; and (4) other serious
violations of the laws and customs of war applicable in armed conflict not of an international
124

IHT Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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character, within the established framework of international law.126 For the purposes of this
memorandum, only the first three types of war crimes apply to the offenses committed.
To be prosecuted for a war crime, five elements must be satisfied. There must be (1) an
act (where “act” can be a number of deplorable offenses set forth in Article 13); (2) the act must
be committed by the perpetrator against a protected person or object; (3) the act must take place
in the context of and be associated with an armed conflict; (4) a nexus must exist between the act
and the armed conflict;127 and (5) the perpetrator must know of the factual circumstances that
established the protected status of the victim, must know of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of the armed conflict, and must possess the requisite mens rea for the
underlying offense.128
1.

There must be an Act
a) Removal of Food, Medical Supplies and Medical Equipment

The first element of a “war crime” is the act. The removal of food, medical supplies and
medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,
particularly the acts of (1) willful killing; (2) inhumane treatment;129 (3) willfully causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or health; and (4) appropriation of property.130 The removal
of food, medical supplies and medical equipment also constituted serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict, particularly the acts of seizing an adverse
126
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party’s property,131 and pillaging.132 Finally, the removal of food, medical supplies and medical
equipment amounted to acts of murder, cruel treatment and torture committed against persons
not taking an active part in the hostilities.
Seizing an adverse party’s property and pillaging are the most appropriate war crimes
charges for the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment. These accusations are
most fitting because Iraq’s chief objective was to plunder Kuwaiti provisions. The elements of
seizing an adverse party’s property include the following: (1) the perpetrator willfully seized
certain property; (2) such property was property of an adverse party; (3) such property was
protected from seizure under the international law of armed conflict; and (4) the seizure was not
justified by military necessity.133 Similarly, elements of pillaging include the following: (1) the
perpetrator appropriated or seized certain property; (2) the perpetrator intended to appropriate or
seize the property for private or personal use; and (3) the appropriation or seizure was without
the consent of the owner of the property.134 According to the Trial Chamber in Blaskic,
appropriation of public or private property “extends to both isolated acts of plunder for private
interest and to the ‘organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a
systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.’”135
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait amounted to
seizure of an adverse party’s property and pillaging. Iraqi perpetrators willfully robbed these
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protected materials without consent of the owner. These acts violated the Geneva Convention
IV, which states that “pillage is prohibited.”136 Moreover, the theft was not justified by military
necessity.
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment also constituted the acts of
willful killing, inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, murder, cruel treatment and torture. All of these crimes require the mens rea of intent.
Intent will be difficult to prove with respect to these types of war crimes because the pillaging
was executed primarily to acquire provisions for Iraq. Prosecutors must show that members of
the former Iraqi regime possessed dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis, that is, they could foresee
with certainty or as a possibility that the removal of food, medical supplies and medical
equipment would result in murder, torture, cruel or inhumane treatment, and great suffering.
b) Destruction of Kuwaiti Assets and Infrastructures
The destruction of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures constitute criminal acts under
Article 13 of the IHT Statute, particularly the following: (1) extensive destruction and
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;137 (2) intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are
not military objectives;138 (3) intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantages anticipated;139 (4) attacking or bombarding, by whatever
means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military
136
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137
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objectives;140 (5) intentionally directing attacks against buildings that are dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;141 and (6)
destroying or seizing the property of an adverse party unless such destruction or seizure is
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.142
The crime of “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”143 is firmly established in
international law.144 Although this offense does not require the complete destruction of property,
the destruction must be extensive.145 Thus, isolated acts do not to rise to the level of
“extensive.”146 The destruction of the objects in Kuwait was clearly excessive in relation to the
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concrete and direct overall military advantages anticipated.147 The number of non-military
objects that were destroyed and burned speaks to the wanton and unlawful nature of the attacks.
In all, 123 schools, 9 hospitals, 662 houses, 1051 public and private institutions, 31 industries, 7
health facilities, 11 hotels, 11 power stations, 106 stores, and 782 oil wells were destroyed or
burned. 148 (See Table 2 infra page 50-52)
The crime of extensive destruction is not justified by military necessity. Military
necessity requires that there must be a reasonable connection between the destruction of property
and the triumph over the enemy.149 Protocol I states that “attacks shall be limited strictly to
military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
actions and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”150 Accordingly, if the destruction is not
justified by military necessity, it is committed unlawfully. The wanton destruction of schools,
hospitals, public and private institutions, industries, health care facilities, hotels, power stations,
stores and oil wells did not purport to achieve a military objective. In most cases it was used to
inflict punishment and harm on the Kuwaitis.
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c) Crimes Against the Environment
Iraqi perpetrators can be prosecuted under Article 13 for crimes against the environment
for igniting oil wells and spilling oil into the Persian Gulf. The IHT statute makes it a crime to
intentionally launch “an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause widespread, longterm and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 151
Environmental devastation during warfare is nothing new. During World War II, Nazis
engaged in “scorched-earth-practices.”152 Similarly, American troops liberally applied Agent
Orange to defoliate the jungles of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Despite the prevalence of
environmental crimes during warfare, the international community inconsistently recognizes
these offenses and rarely prosecutes offenders. For example, the ICTY and the ICTR have no
jurisdiction for crimes against the environment. In contrast, the Rome Statute extends liability
for “severe damage to the natural environment.”153 Similar divergences exist with regard to
international conventions. For instance, countries such as the United States and Iraq do not
recognize Protocol I,154 which states that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
151
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operations ‘States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60]
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the natural environment.”155 However, these countries have signed the 1977 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,156
which states that “each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”157
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the IHT has jurisdiction for crimes against the
environment. In order to be convicted for this crime, six elements must be satisfied:158 (1) the
perpetrator must launch an attack; (2) the attack must be such that it causes incidental damage to
the natural environment and the damage must be to such an extent that it is clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (3) the damage to the
natural environment must be widespread, long-term and severe; (4) the perpetrator must know
that the attack is likely to cause incidental widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment and that such damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (5) the conduct must
take place in the context of and be associated with an international armed conflict; and (6) the
perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict. Holding Iraqi perpetrators accountable under the IHT Statute is consistent with UN
155
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Resolution 687, which declared that Iraq would be liable for “any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage, and the depletion of natural resources” inflicted on Kuwait during the
Iraqi invasion.159
The first of the six elements, that the perpetrator launches an attack, is satisfied. In an
unjustified attempt to deter coalition forces from attacking Iraqi forces by land, air and water,
Saddam ordered his forces to bomb the Kuwaiti oil fields near the Saudi Arabian border, two
major mainland refineries, an offshore loading terminal, and anchored tankers. 160 (See Table 3
infra page 52) Additionally, Iraqi forces pumped several million barrels of oil into the Persian
Gulf from supplies lines connecting offshore terminals to oil refineries.161 Finally, as Iraqi forces
retreated from Kuwait to Iraq, they ignited hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells and blasted the wells’
safety valves necessary to turn off the oil flow.162
The resulting damage to the environment was excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated. Although the destruction of the environment is
often an inevitable result of armed conflict, a party’s actions should adhere to the four main
principles of war - humanity, necessity, discrimination and proportionality - in order to mitigate
environmental damage.163 These four doctrines respectively require that the action must attempt
to avoid unnecessary suffering, the action must be required to achieve a military objective, the
weaponry utilized should discriminate between lawful and unlawful targets, and the means used
159
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to pursue a military goal must be proportional to the magnitude of the objective.164 The Iraqi
bombing of the oil wells and the release of oil violated these principles. Although defense
counsel might argue that the ignition of the oil wells and the spilling of oil provided a smokescreen to facilitate the Iraqi retreat, the attacks were not proportional to the military objective.
Ultimately, the attacks on the environmental can be characterized as acts of desperation, spite
and vengeance.
The damage to the environment must also be widespread, long-term and severe. It is to
be noted that this requirement is conjunctive, requiring the damage to be “widespread” and
“long-term” and “severe.”165 The statute is silent on the definition of these terms. According to
the Geneva Conference of the Committee of Disarmament Understanding, “widespread” means
encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; “long-lasting” means
lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; and “severe” means involving serious
or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources.166 The
definitions of “widespread,” “long-term,” and “severe” have been interpreted differently by other
authorities. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross interprets “long-term” as
meaning lasting for decades rather than months.167 The German Military Manual interprets
“widespread, long-term, and severe” damage as a major interference with human life or natural
164
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resources.168 How these terms - widespread, long-term, and severe - are interpreted is very
important because if the threshold is too demanding, then the statute will lose all practical
application and consequent viability.169
It is often difficult to establish a relationship between a given activity and its supposed
harmful effects on the environment. Factors such as the distance between the origin of the
pollution and the damage, time, the possibility of cumulative environmental degradation, the
potential for the combination of pollutants, and the fact that pollution caused by human activity
can be amplified by natural phenomena, often contribute to the difficulty of connecting the act to
the damage.170 Nevertheless, it is apparent that the acts committed against the environment
caused widespread and severe damage. The oil fires and oil spills effected ecosystems across the
globe.171 Additionally, there was significant disruption and harm to human life, flora and fauna,
as well as natural and economic resources. It will be more difficult to prove that the oil fires and
oil spills were “long-term,” especially if “long-term” is interpreted as lasting for decades. Given
nature’s ability to heal itself, long-term damage will be difficult to measure in terms of
longevity.172 Additionally, analyzing long-term effects would require the prosecution to delay
trial. Finally, scientific methods for evaluating environmental damage, including reliability or
error rate, might be attacked as faulty.
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The mens rea of an attack against the environment requires both intent and knowledge.
Article 13 requires that the perpetrator “intentionally” launch the attack with “knowledge.”173 It
is clear that Iraqi forces intentionally launched the attack against the environment, but it will be
difficult to prove that Saddam and his followers knew that the attack would cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such damage would be of such
an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. In his analysis of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which is nearly
identical to IHT Article 13(b)(5), Mark A. Drumbl concludes that “proof that someone did not
know that the act would commit ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ damage would, under the
present wording, be sufficient to absolve that individual from criminal sanction.”174 Thus,
proving the requisite mens rea will be a substantial hurdle to overcome.
The final two elements, that the attack took place in the context of and was associated
with an international armed conflict, and that the perpetrator was aware of the factual
circumstance that established the existence of an armed conflict were present.175
2.

The Act must be Committed Against A Protected Person or Object
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment, the destruction of Kuwaiti

assets and infrastructures, and the crimes against the environment were committed against
protected persons and objects. Under Article 13, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
must be committed against protected persons and objects.176 Specifically, the Geneva
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Conventions call for the protection of the wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field, the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea, prisoners of war, and
civilian persons in time of war.177 Additionally, the Geneva Conventions protect hospitals,
medical service buildings, ambulances, vehicles, medical equipment and materials, hospital
ships, coastal rescue crafts, coastal medical installations, civilian hospitals and their equipment,
medical transports, movable or immovable property (in occupied territories), and food and
medical supplies of the population (in occupied territories).178 Also under Article 13, the
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict must be committed
against specific objects.179 In particular, the statute prohibits attacks against civilian objects,
towns, villages, dwellings, buildings (including buildings which are dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes), historic monuments, hospitals, places where the
sick and wounded reside, and the environment.180 Finally, Article 13 forbids acts committed in
armed conflict against persons not taking an active part in the hostilities, including members of
the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other cause.181
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The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was an act committed
against civilian persons in time of war182 and against persons not taking an active part in the
hostilities. Similarly, the destruction of Kuwaiti assets constituted acts committed against
protected objects, including houses, schools, hospitals, historic monuments, power stations,
roads, stores and oil-related infrastructures. Finally, the destruction of oil wells and the spilling
of oil into the Persian Gulf amounted to acts against the environment, which is protected by the
IHT Statute.183
3.

The Act must take Place in the Context of and be Associated with an Armed
Conflict
Iraqi perpetrators committed the prohibited acts during an armed conflict. The IHT

Statute stipulates that war crimes are applicable only in “armed conflict.”184 Likewise, the
Geneva Convention requires that “war crimes” be committed in cases of “declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even
if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”185 Additionally, “other serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,” must occur in an international
armed conflict.186 Finally, acts committed against persons not taking an active part in hostilities
must be committed during armed conflict.187
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An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or
between such groups within a State.188 In Musema, the ICTR defined “armed conflict” as the
“existence of open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser
degree.”189 To determine the existence of an armed conflict, the court in Tadic applied a twofactor test hinging on (1) the intensity of the conflict and (2) the organization of the parties to the
conflict.190 “These criteria are used ‘solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an
armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities,
which are not subject to international humanitarian law.’”191 It is quite evident from historical
accounts that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was sufficiently intense, and on the part of the Iraqis,
sufficiently organized. For example, the first wave of Iraqi invaders included over one-hundred
and twenty thousand soldiers who came in combat aircrafts, battle tanks, armored personnel
carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and armed helicopters.192 Iraqi commanders instructed these
Iraqi troops to take control of the specific Kuwaiti oil fields, cities, and ports.193 Additionally,
the Gulf War between Iraq and coalition forces was sufficiently intense and organized to
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constitute an armed conflict. Specifically, coalition forces led an intense air campaign for five
weeks before commencing an air and land assault to force Saddam out of Kuwait.194
The absence of open hostilities lasting from August 8, 1990, the date on which Iraq
annexed Kuwait, to January 16, 1991, the commencement of the Gulf War, raises the question of
whether there was an armed conflict during this time. According to the Department of Defense
Military Commission, the phrase
in the context of and was associated with armed conflict…does not require a
declaration of war, ongoing mutual hostilities, or confrontation involving a
regular national armed force. A single hostile act or attempted act may provide
sufficient basis for the nexus [between the conduct and the armed hostilities] so
long as its magnitude or severity rises to the level of an ‘armed attack’ or an ‘act
of war’ or the number, power, stated intent or organization of the force with
which the actor is associated is such that the act or attempted act is tantamount to
an attack by an armed force.195
This novel definition reduces the “armed conflict threshold to require merely a single severe
terrorist act. 196
This interpretation of armed conflict advocates two important principles. First, a
unilateral attack can be considered armed conflict if it is sufficiently intense. Therefore, the
unilateral attacks on Kuwaitis during the Iraqi occupation, which were sufficiently intense, can
be considered armed conflict. Second, armed conflict does not require ongoing mutual
hostilities. Thus, the gap between the hostilities involving Iraqi and Kuwaiti forces and Iraqi and
coalition forces did not terminate the armed conflict. Consistent with this interpretation, the
194
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ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic asserted that “international humanitarian law applies from the
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is
achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”197
Proving the existence of an armed conflict also requires quashing the validity of the Iraqi
annexation of Kuwait. After World War II, the Germans attempted to advance the doctrine of
subjugation, which states that once a country becomes annexed, it is no longer protected by the
laws of war. The IMT rejected this theory, holding that there can be no annexation of an
occupied territory so long as there is an opposing army in the field of battle.198 As established
already, the absence of armed forces in the field is not indicative of the cessation of the armed
conflict. Moreover, the Iraqi annexation was facially unlawful. Article 5(3) of the Definition of
Aggression states that “no territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is
or shall be recognized as lawful.”199 Additionally, Security Counsel Resolution 662 held the
annexation of Kuwait void.200 Finally, Article 47 of the Geneva Convention IV provides that
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protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived of the benefits of the
Convention by any annexation.201
4.

There must be a Nexus between the Armed Conflict and the Act

The acts of the Iraqi perpetrators were sufficiently linked to the armed conflict. For a war
crime to fall within the jurisdiction of the IHT, a sufficient nexus between the armed conflict and
the act must exist. A nexus between the armed conflict and the act exists even if the armed
conflict does not occur in the regions where the crimes took place.202 “It is sufficient that the
alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories
controlled by the parties to the conflict.”203
The acts of the Iraqis were sufficiently connected to the armed conflict. The removal of
food, medical supplies and medical equipment and the destruction of Kuwaiti assets and
infrastructures were brought about in the context of armed conflict. The Iraqi perpetrators used
pillage and destruction as means to suppress, intimidate and torture the Kuwaiti nation.
Likewise, the environmental destruction was closely connected to the armed conflict. At the end
of the Gulf War, Iraqi forces attacked the environment to delay and impede coalition forces.
5.

The Perpetrator must Possess the Mens Rea of Knowledge and Intent

The final element, the mens rea, must be satisfied for each crime. Specifically, the
perpetrator must have knowledge of the factual circumstances that established the protected
status of the victim and must have knowledge of the factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.204 The perpetrator must also have the mens rea for the

201

Geneva Convention IV, supra note 7, art. 47. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

202

Tadic Trial Chamber, supra note 9, para. 573. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]

203

Tadic Appeals Chamber, supra note 197, at para. 70. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]

204

Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72]

44

underlying offense.205 These requirements are consistent with the Regime Crimes Liaison
Office’s interpretation of the IHT Statute, which provides that “unless otherwise provided, a
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.206
a) Knowledge
The IHT statute does not require that the perpetrator conduct a legal evaluation as to the
existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-international, nor does the
statute require that the perpetrator be aware of the facts that establish the conflict as international
or non-international. There is only a requirement that the perpetrator was aware of the factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms of
“took place in the context of and was associated with.”207 In light of these conditions, it is
evident that Iraqi perpetrators knew of the armed conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait, and Iraq
and coalition forces.
b) Intent
Most crimes under Article 13 require intent.208 Evidence indicates that Iraqi perpetrators
intended to remove food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq, intended
to destroy Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures, intended to destroy Kuwaiti oil wells, oil refineries
and oil tankers, and intended to spill oil into the Persian Gulf. However, like crimes against
humanity, prosecutors will have to show that Iraqi perpetrators possessed dolus indirectus or
205
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dolus eventualis for the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment from Kuwait
to Iraq.
The prosecution will also want to pay close attention to the war crime of “destruction and
appropriation of protected property.” While this offense requires intent, the statute also
stipulates that the crime must be carried out “unlawfully and wantonly.”209 “The wanton
destruction or appropriation of property adds a dimension to the element of intent, designating a
reckless disregard for the rights of others.”210 Accordingly, it can be interpreted that this crime
requires dolus directus. Therefore, the prosecution must prove that Iraqi perpetrators foresaw
and desired as their primary goal the destruction of property not justified by military necessity.

IV. CONCLUSION
Iraqi perpetrators committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in violation of
Article 12 and 13 of the IHT Statute. Specifically, the removal of food, medical supplies and
medical equipment from Kuwait to Iraq constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes,
while the destruction of Kuwaiti assets and the crimes against the environment constituted war
crimes.
The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment amounted to crimes
against humanity. This act constituted extermination, torture and other inhuman acts.
Additionally, the removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was objectively part
of widespread and systematic attacks perpetrated against a civilian population. Finally, the
perpetrators committed these acts with the requisite mens rea, particularly knowledge and dolus
directus, dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis.
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The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment along with the destruction
of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures, and the crimes against the environment, constituted war
crimes. These acts amounted to violations of the Geneva Convention, the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, and acts committed against person not taking an active
part in hostilities. The removal of food, medical supplies and medical equipment was equivalent
to willful killing; inhumane treatment; willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health; and appropriation of property. The destruction of Kuwaiti assets and infrastructures
amounted to extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; intentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; intentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause damage to civilian objects which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantages anticipated; attacking
or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are
undefended and which are not military objectives; intentionally directing attacks against
buildings that are dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are
not military objectives; and destroying or seizing the property of an adverse party unless such
destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Finally, crimes
against the environment constituted intentionally launching “an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated.” Iraqi perpetrators committed these war crimes against protected persons and
objects during an armed conflict in which there was a nexus between the act and the armed
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conflict. The perpetrators also possessed the requisite mens rea for the underlying offenses¸
particularly knowledge, and dolus directus, dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis.
Despite the commission of these crimes, prosecutors will have trouble proving all of the
elements of crimes against the environment. The prosecution will likely face difficulties trying
to prove long-term damage to the environment. Additionally, it will be difficult to prove that the
Iraqi perpetrators knew the environmental attacks would cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment. In spite of these obstacles, prosecutors should still prosecute
the members of the Iraqi former regime for crimes against the environment because justice
requires that these crimes do not go unpunished.
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Table 1: The number of deaths during the period of occupation according to age, sex and
reason of death.211
Age (Years
Reason of
Death
Injuries of
War
Heart
Problems
Car
Accidents
Cancer
Renal
Failure
Lack of
Medication
Unknown
Total

211

<12

12- Less than
50
Male Female

50 –Less than
70
Male Female

≥ 70
Male

Female

Total

2

2

1

465

104

105

91

55

492

23

23

9

8

8

147

21
12

18
10

14
14

7
8

8
7

8
4

170
59

96

113

71

54

43

52

61

596

13
182

22
712

6
161

12
236

5
179

9
177

4
141

99
2028

Male

Female

11

4

427

3

15

28

28

61

30

12

8

56

55
-

39
4

106
28
240

Atlas of Iraqi War Crimes, supra note 42, at 17. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]
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Table 2: The number of houses and buildings that were destroyed and set on fire in the
State of Kuwait.212
Area
Schools
Bneid Al Gar
Khaldiya
Dasma
Daiya
Safarat
Rawda
Doha
Shamiya
Shuwaikh
(Residential
Shuwaikh
(NonResidential)
Sulaibikhat
Abdullah Al
Salem
Idaliya
Granada
Faiha
Qadisiya
Kuwait City
Kaifan
Mansouriya
Nuzha
Bayan
Jabriya
Hawally
Rumaithiya
Salmiya
Salwa
Shaab
Sabah Al
Salem
Qurain
Mishref
Andalus
Jileeb Al
Shuyoukh
Khaitan
212

3
3
2
2
-

Burning & Destruction
Hospitals
Houses
Public
Institutions
6
1
3
1
1
1
1
5
3
8
4
2
3
3
1
4
-

Total
Private
Institutions
2
4
1
2
8
2
1
-

9
11
7
7
3
22
9
5
4

2

-

2

10

55

69

1
1

-

9
2

3
1

11
2

24
6

1
3
7
14
5
1
4

1
1
-

1
1
6
3
4
2
2
11
8
18
35
8
1
25

1
2
18
3
2
7
3
3
1
9
5
2
7

2
1
191
6
1
2
2
5
46
22
52
1
3
8

5
1
9
4
213
9
5
4
23
16
105
55
101
14
7
44

1
17

-

1
2
10
46

4
1
6

3
3
75

8
7
10
144

14

-

54

8

36

112

48

Id. at 25-26.
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Rabiya
Riggae
Al Rai
Surra
Sabah Al
Nasser
Sabhan
Ardiya
Omariya
Firdous
Farwaniya
Qurtuba
Yarmouk
Abu Halifa
Ahmadi
Oum Al
Heman
Rigga
Sabahiya
Dahr
Fahahel
Fintas
Mangaf
Mahboula
Jahra
Sulaibiya
Total

2
-

1
-

8
8
-

3
2
1

1
2
29
2
2

12
13
29
4
3

1
1
6
2
2
1
-

2
-

27
7
26
30
1
9
16
13

1
3
3
12
20
-

10
9
3
12
49
1
1
3
21
-

11
40
14
44
93
1
2
14
60
13

26
39
10
22
1
13
1
47
24
662
35.8%

1
2
2
3
2
9
2
173
9.3%

9
15
52
7
10
1
64
18
878
47.5%

40
57
16
81
9
27
2
136
52
1845

4
1
4
4
1
2
14
7
123
6.6%

2
1
9
0.8%
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Table 3: The number of oil wells that were destroyed in the State of Kuwait by the Iraqi
Regime during the occupation.213
Name of Field

Exploded &
Burnt Wells

Magwa
Ahmadi
Burghan
Rawdhatain
Sabriya
Ratga
Bahra
Total

98
60
291
62
39
1
3
554

213

Exploded &
Non-Burnt
Wells
6
3
24
2
4
2
41

Id. at 23.

52

Destroyed
Wells
21
17
28
5
9
80

NonDestroyed
Wells
15
6
67
3
8
8
107

Total
140
86
410
72
60
9
5
782

